

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RICHARD VIETH, NORMA JEAN
VIETH, and SUSAN FUREY,

Plaintiffs

v.

COMMONWEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA, *et al.*

Defendants

CIVIL NO.1:CV-01-2439

OPINION OF THE COURT¹

Before the court are: (1) a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) filed by Defendants Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Governor Mark Schweiker, Secretary of State Kim Pizzingrilli, and Commissioner of the Bureau of Commissions, Elections, and Legislation Richard Filling ("Executive Officers"); (2) Defendant Executive Officers' motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6); (3) a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Matthew Ryan and Robert Jubelirer ("Presiding Officers")²; and (4) Defendant Presiding Officers' motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The parties have briefed the issues, and the matter is ripe for disposition.

¹RAMBO, SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE authored the Opinion of the Court in which NYGAARD, CIRCUIT JUDGE and YOHN, DISTRICT JUDGE join.

²Defendant Ryan is the Speaker of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives, and Defendant Jubelirer is the Lieutenant Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Thus, Speaker Ryan presides over the Pennsylvania House of Representatives, and Lieutenant Governor Jubelirer presides over the Pennsylvania State Senate.

I. Background

A. Factual Allegations

Plaintiffs Richard Vieth, Norma Jean Vieth, and Susan Furey brought this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Defendant Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Defendant Executive Officers, and Defendant Presiding Officers. Plaintiffs' claims arise out of the enactment of Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1200 ("Act 1"), Pennsylvania's Congressional redistricting plan, which Governor Schweiker signed into law on January 7, 2002.

Plaintiffs allege the following facts in their complaint: On December 28, 2000, the United States Secretary of Commerce reported the results of the year 2000 decennial national census to then President William J. Clinton. The tabulation indicated that as of April 1, 2000 Pennsylvania had a resident population of 12,281,054 persons. Accordingly, the Secretary of Commerce's report allotted Pennsylvania only nineteen Congressional representatives resulting in a decrease of two representatives from the results of the 1990 census.

Thus, the responsibility for adopting a Congressional redistricting plan fell to Pennsylvania's General Assembly, which failed to reach a compromise during the regular 2001 legislative session. The State House of Representatives passed one version, and the State Senate passed a different plan. The General Assembly, however, adjourned at an impasse on December 13, 2001.³

In the meantime, prominent national figures in the Republican party – such as congressional Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert, Congressman Thomas

³Plaintiffs also allege that the Republican party enjoys majorities in both state houses and holds the Governor's office.

M. Davis III, United States Senator Rick Santorum, and Karl Rove, political consultant to current President George W. Bush – began pressuring Governor Schweiker, a Republican, and the Republican members of the General Assembly to adopt the Senate redistricting plan as a punitive measure against Democrats for having enacted apparently pro-Democrat redistricting plans in other states. In response, Republican members of the state House and Senate began working together to reach an agreement. In the process, they effectively ignored all Democratic members of the General Assembly, including members of the Conference Committee appointed to resolve the impasse between the competing plans.

At the Conference Committee meeting on January 2, 2002, the Republicans presented the final version (“Senate Bill 1200”) of the new redistricting plan. The Democratic members of the Conference Committee had no input on this version. Although the bill passed the Conference Committee, thus sending it for a vote before both houses, all Democratic members of the Conference Committee voted against the version, and all Republicans voted in favor. On January 3, 2002, the General Assembly passed Senate Bill 1200. On January 7, 2002, Governor Schweiker signed the bill into law as Act 1.

Plaintiffs, registered Democrats and Pennsylvania citizens, subsequently filed this suit to enjoin Act 1’s implementation. Plaintiffs Richard and Norma Jean Vieth both reside in Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, in a portion of the county that will fall in District 16 under Act 1. Plaintiff Susan Furey resides in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania. Under Act 1’s precursor, Plaintiff Furey’s residence fell in District 13. However, under Act 1, Plaintiff Furey now resides in District 6.

Defendants are the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and various executive and legislative officers who were either responsible for enacting Act 1 or will be responsible for implementing it during the next Congressional election.

According to the results of the 2000 census, Pennsylvania has a population of 12,281,054. When divided equally among the nineteen Congressional districts, this results in a population of 646,371 or 646,372 people per district.⁴ However, under Act 1, District 7 would have a population of 646,380. On the other hand, Districts 1, 2, and 17 would each have a population of 646,361. Thus, under Act 1 there is a nineteen-person deviation between the least populated and most populated districts. While this is less than the deviation under the 1992 plan, unlike that plan, Act 1 splits eighty-four local governments (including twenty-five counties and fifty-nine cities, boroughs or townships) among different congressional districts. Montgomery County, where Plaintiff Furey resides, is divided up among six different congressional districts. Under the 1992 plan, only twenty-seven local governments (nineteen counties and eight cities, townships or boroughs) were split between different districts. Additionally, Districts 4, 6, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, and 19 have populations of over 646,372 without any legitimate justification.

Currently, the two major parties hold nearly equal support in the Commonwealth. Of voters registered with one of the two major parties, 53.6% are registered Democrats and 46.4% are registered Republicans. In November 2000, during the last election held under the 1992 plan, voters in Pennsylvania elected eleven Republican congressman and ten Democratic congressman to serve in Washington. In those twenty-one congressional races, Democrats garnered 50.6% of

⁴The actual result is 646,371.263157.

the aggregate vote, with Republicans receiving 49.4% . Democrats also received more total votes than Republicans, by a margin of 50.1% to 49.9%, in the five statewide races in 2000.⁵ Yet despite this nearly equal split, Democrats will likely win only six of Pennsylvania's nineteen congressional seats. Thus, Act 1 is "designed to ensure that Republicans would win at least 13 of the 19 congressional seats." (Amd. Compl. at ¶ 32.) "It cements Republican power and effectively reduces Democrats to being a small minority of the Commonwealth's congressional delegation for the coming election and likely the coming decade." (*Id.* at ¶ 33.)

As a direct result, Act 1 "dramatically affects the Democratic Party's prospects for success in congressional elections in Pennsylvania . . . and will reduce the choices that voters . . . will have in Pennsylvania elections." (*Id.* at ¶ 35.) "Because of the bias . . . the Democratic Party will have greater difficulty in fielding competitive candidates." (*Id.*) Thus, Act 1 operates "to essentially shut Democrats and Democratic voters out of the political process." (*Id.* at ¶ 36.) Plaintiffs, in particular, "will suffer harm . . . [because they] will now be increasingly represented by members of Congress who do not represent their views." (*Id.* at 37.)

B. Procedural History

On December 21, 2001, Plaintiffs filed the original complaint in this matter. Subsequently, Plaintiffs filed a motion to convene a three-judge panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284(b)(1). By an order dated January 23, 2002, the court granted Plaintiffs' motion and requested that Chief Judge Edward Becker of the

⁵In 2000, Pennsylvania held statewide elections for President, one United States Senate position, State Attorney General, State Auditor General, and State Treasurer. Democratic candidates won the elections for President and Auditor General, and Republican candidates won the elections for Attorney General, State Treasurer and United States Senator.

Third Circuit Court of Appeals appoint the members of the panel. Chief Judge Becker appointed the current panel: The Honorable Richard Nygaard, United States Circuit Judge for the Third Circuit Court of Appeals; The Honorable William H. Yohn, Jr., United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania; and The Honorable Sylvia Rambo, Senior United States District Court Judge for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.

On January 11, 2002, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.⁶ In that document, Plaintiffs allege that Act 1 violates: (1) Article I, § 2 of the United States Constitution; (2) the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (4) Plaintiffs' right to free association guaranteed by the First Amendment. Accordingly, Plaintiffs seek the following declaratory and injunctive relief: (1) a declaratory judgment that Act 1 violates Plaintiffs' constitutional rights; (2) a permanent injunction preventing Defendants from implementing Act 1; (3) a court order establishing a new congressional redistricting plan and enjoining Defendants from enacting or implementing a new plan until the 2004 elections; and (4) attorney's fees and court costs.

On January 22, 2002, Plaintiffs filed a motion requesting that the court set a deadline of February 18, 2002 for the state courts to conclude all litigation

⁶Plaintiffs include the violation of § 1983 under a separate count. However, "§ 1983 does not create substantive rights but 'merely redresses the deprivation of . . . rights. . . created by the Constitution or federal statute.'" *Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. for M.E.*, 178 F.3d 238, 251-52 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting *W.B. v. Matula*, 67 F.3d 484, 493 (3d Cir. 1995)). Therefore, the court will construe Plaintiffs' amended complaint as an action brought pursuant to § 1983 to vindicate their rights under the Constitution.

pertaining to Act 1.⁷ Additionally, Plaintiffs filed an expedited motion for appointment of the three-judge panel. By an order dated January 24, 2002, the court denied Plaintiffs' motion to set a deadline and denied, as moot, Plaintiffs' expedited motion to convene a three-judge panel. By a separate order issued on January 24, 2002, the court set the case for an evidentiary hearing to be conducted on February 11 and February 12, 2002.

Also on January 24, 2002, both Defendant Presiding Officers and Executive Officers filed the separate motions to dismiss which are currently before the court. Defendant Presiding Officers followed this with a motion to abstain, filed on January 25, 2002. By separate orders, the court established an expedited briefing schedule for both the motions to dismiss and the motion for abstention.

Defendant Presiding Officers filed a motion for reconsideration and *vacatur* of the court's January 24, 2002 order that set the captioned matter for an evidentiary hearing starting February 11, 2002. The court held a telephone conference on January 29, 2002, which all parties attended, in order to discuss the reconsideration motion. During the conference call, counsel informed the court that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued an order that afternoon requiring the Commonwealth Court to hold a hearing on Act 1 by February 1, 2002. Additionally, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ordered the Commonwealth Court to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law by February 8, 2002 addressing the validity of Act 1 under the Pennsylvania Constitution. In light of these circumstances, by an

⁷Currently, there is a state court action pending which attacks Act 1 on the basis that it violates the Pennsylvania Constitution. See *Efer v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania*, 10 M.D. 2002 (Pa. Commw. Ct.).

order dated January 30, 2002, the court delayed the evidentiary hearing until March 11, 2002 and set an expedited discovery schedule.

II. Discussion

A. Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)

1. Legal Standard

“A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges the jurisdiction of the court to address the merits of the plaintiff’s complaint.” *Ballenger v. Applied Digital Solutions, Inc.*, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1518 at *8 (D. Del. January 31, 2002). The motion should be granted where the asserted claim is “insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.” *Coxson v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania*, 935 F. Supp. 624, 626 (W.D. Pa. 1996) (citing *Growth Horizons v. Delaware County*, 983 F.2d 1277, 1280-81 (3d Cir. 1993)). Additionally, a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) may present either a facial or factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction. *See Mortensen v. First Federal Savings and Loan*, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977).

This case presents a facial challenge because Defendants do not dispute, at this juncture, the existence of the jurisdictional facts alleged in the complaint. *See* 2 James Wm. Moore *et al.*, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 12.30[4] (3d ed. 1999) (explaining the difference between a facial and factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)). Therefore, the court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of

the plaintiff. *Zinerman v. Burch*, 494 U.S. 113, 118 (1990); *Markowitz v. Northeast Land Co.*, 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990).

2. Partisan Gerrymandering Claim

In their motions to dismiss, Defendants contend that claims of partisan gerrymandering are non-justiciable. Thus, according to Defendants, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear such claims. However, Defendants also acknowledge that in *Davis v. Bandemer*, 478 U.S. 109 (1986), the Supreme Court held that such claims are justiciable as equal protection violations. Instead of arguing for dismissal, Defendants wish to have their objections to this holding noted on the record in case they seek to raise the issue at a later time. Accordingly, the court notes the objection.

3. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

_____ Defendant Commonwealth of Pennsylvania seeks dismissal of the claims against it arguing that it is immune from suit in federal court based on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. At a minimum, the Eleventh Amendment stands for two propositions: “first, that each State is a sovereign entity in our federal system; and second, that it is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent.” *Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida*, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, the Eleventh Amendment “prohibits federal courts from entertaining suits by private parties against States and their agencies.” *Alabama v. Pugh*, 438 U.S. 781, 791 (1978). This bar applies regardless of whether the plaintiff seeks monetary damages or injunctive relief against a State. *Seminole Tribe*, 517 U.S. at 58 (citing *Cory v. White*, 457 U.S. 85, 90 (1982) (“It would be a novel proposition indeed that the

Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit to enjoin the State itself simply because no money judgment is sought.”)).

Under certain circumstances, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar federal courts from entertaining suits against States. First, suit is permitted where the State has waived its immunity. *Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon*, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985). Second, sovereign immunity does not apply if Congress validly abrogates it through its enforcement powers pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. *Seminole Tribe*, 517 U.S. at 57-73. Third, Eleventh Amendment immunity is inapplicable where the plaintiff sues State officials in their official capacity seeking only prospective relief. *Ex Parte Young*, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).

In this case, Plaintiffs have brought suit against the Commonwealth thereby implicating its sovereign immunity. Plaintiffs do not contend that the Commonwealth has waived its immunity, nor could they. Pennsylvania has clearly reserved its power to invoke sovereign immunity. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8521(b) (2001). Likewise, Plaintiffs could not contend that by enacting § 1983, Congress validly abrogated Pennsylvania’s sovereign immunity. *See Quern v. Jordan*, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1978) (“[Section] 1983 does not explicitly and by clear language indicate on its face an intent to sweep away the immunity of the States; nor does it have a history which focuses directly on the question of state liability and which shows that Congress considered and firmly decided to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States.”). *Ex Parte Young* is not implicated here. The Commonwealth is the only defendant to raise sovereign immunity as a defense.

Because the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania under the circumstances present in this case, the court will dismiss the action against the Commonwealth for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

4. Standing

The constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements:

First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact" – an invasion of a legally protected interest that is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of . . . Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (citations omitted). The party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction bears the burden of alleging facts that "he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute." *Warth v. Seldin*, 422 U.S. 490, 518 (1975); *see also McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.*, 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936).

a. **Partisan Gerrymandering**

Defendants contend that Count II of Plaintiffs' amended complaint, alleging that Act 1 constitutes impermissible partisan gerrymandering in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, must be dismissed because Plaintiffs lack standing. The crux of Defendants' argument is that Plaintiffs do not have standing to challenge Act 1 as a whole.⁸

Defendants would have the court apply the standing requirement for racial gerrymandering cases to those involving only partisan gerrymandering. In the

⁸Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs have failed to establish standing because Plaintiffs "allege only group harm (i.e., to Democrat voters & the Democrat Party), not harm to their individual interests." (Def. Pres. Offs. Br. in Sup. Mot. to Dis. at 6.) However, Defendants overlook the fact that Plaintiffs allege harm to them as individual members of the Democratic party.

context of racial gerrymandering, in order to have standing a plaintiff must allege that he resides in a district that has been impermissibly gerrymandered on the basis of race. *United States v. Hays*, 515 U.S. 737, 743-44 (1995). Racial gerrymandering is prohibited because, where a district is created solely to serve the perceived common interests of one racial group, it is reasonable to presume that elected officials in such districts will ignore the plights of non-members of the dominant racial group. This stems from the corollary that racial classifications are disfavored in general because they threaten to stigmatize individuals according to their race and incite racial hostility. *Id.* at 744 (citing *Shaw v. Reno*, 509 U.S. 630, 648 (1993)). Therefore, only where a person resides in a district created to cater to one race over another can he allege to have suffered the particularized harm necessary to justify standing. "On the other hand, where a plaintiff does not live in such a district, he . . . does not suffer those special harms, and any inference that the plaintiff has personally been subject to a racial classification would not be justified absent evidence tending to support that inference." *Id.* at 745.

The reasoning underlying claims based on racial gerrymandering, however, is quite distinct from the type of injury that partisan gerrymandering inflicts. The very nature of a claim of partisan gerrymandering contemplates a harm which extends beyond that inflicted upon a particular voter. Rather, such a claim envisions harm to a particular class of voters that results in impermissibly denying them participation in the political process. The Supreme Court recognized this principal in *Davis v. Bandemer*, the first case holding that partisan gerrymandering may be actionable as a violation of equal protection. In that decision, the Court stated: "Although the statewide discrimination here was allegedly accomplished

through the manipulation of individual district lines, the focus of the equal protection inquiry is necessarily somewhat different from that involved in the review of individual districts.” 478 U.S. at 127.⁹

In equal protection claims based on partisan gerrymandering, the allegation is that an identifiable political group has had its political voice silenced through the drawing of elective district lines. Although this involves, to a certain extent, manipulation of individual district lines, the injury is done to the entire identifiable political group. The constitutional injury lies not in inequality among various individual districts, but rather in the configuration of the districts as a whole when they serve to disadvantage a certain class of voters. Therefore, unlike a claim for race-based gerrymandering, a plaintiff in a partisan gerrymandering claim need not allege that he lives in a particular district that has been gerrymandered on the basis of political affiliation.

Additionally, we do not agree with Defendants that adopting such a standing rule would endow nationwide standing upon all individual members of the major political parties. In the context of partisan gerrymandering, to satisfy the particularized harm requirement, a plaintiff must allege that he or she is a member of a politically salient class whose geographical distribution is sufficiently ascertainable that it could have been taken into account when drawing district boundaries. In this case, Plaintiffs allege that they are citizens of Pennsylvania and members of the Democratic party. Additionally, they allege that Defendants have utilized the

⁹Moreover, we note that to the extent that an individual plaintiff is required to live in an allegedly gerrymandered district, Plaintiffs have met that requirement. Plaintiff Furey lives in District 6. (Amd. Compl. at ¶ 4.) Plaintiffs allege that District 6 is one of the gerrymandered districts. (Amd. Compl. at ¶ 22.)

congressional redistricting process to vanquish Plaintiffs' political voice in Congress. These allegations, together, are sufficient to satisfy the particularized injury requirement for standing.

b. Remaining Claims

As to the remaining claims, Defendants intimate that Plaintiffs do not have standing because the injury that they allege is "speculative and generalized," (Def. Exec. Offs. Br. in Sup. Mot. to Dis. at 7,) and is "a purely hypothetical harm, tied to the allegation of partisan gerrymandering." (Def. Pres. Offs. Br. in Sup. Mot to Dis. at 7.) We disagree.

Defendants are correct that Plaintiffs do not allege that they have suffered an injury in fact as of this moment. However, Act 1 has yet to be implemented. Plaintiffs have clearly alleged that if Act 1 is allowed to be implemented it will cause a very real harm. Principally, Plaintiffs claim that their vote has been diluted in violation of the one person-one vote requirement of Article I. That harm is completely distinct from the harm that would be inflicted as a result of partisan gerrymandering. Act 1 has been enacted and, as of now, is scheduled to be used as the congressional district plan in the 2002 elections. If Act 1 is – as Plaintiffs have alleged – unconstitutional, then Plaintiffs have alleged a harm that is "actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical" *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 560. Therefore, the court has no problem concluding that Plaintiffs have alleged an injury in fact.¹⁰ Likewise, Plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded a causal connection between Defendants' conduct and the injury. Finally, as will be discussed below, *see infra* at

¹⁰As to the one person-one vote claim, the court notes that no Plaintiff resides in an under-populated district. Additionally, Plaintiffs have alleged that there are districts that are under populated. Therefore, according to Plaintiffs' allegations, they have suffered an injury in fact due to vote dilution.

Part II.B.7, the court has the remedial powers to redress the injuries that Plaintiffs have alleged. In short, the court finds that the allegations of Counts I, III, and IV of Plaintiffs' amended complaint satisfy the constitutional minimum of standing.

B. Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

1. Legal Standard

In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6), the court is required to accept as true all of the factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the face of the complaint. *Nami v. Fauver*, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996). "The complaint will be deemed to have alleged sufficient facts if it adequately put[s] the defendant[s] on notice of the essential elements of the plaintiff's cause of action." *Id.* The court will not dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim "unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff[s] can prove no set of facts in support of [their] claim that would entitle [them] to relief." *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).

"In determining whether a claim should be dismissed under [Federal] Rule 12(b)(6), a court looks only to the facts alleged in the complaint and its attachments without reference to other parts of the record." *Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel*, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, the court may consider "undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the [attached] document[s]." *Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Ind.*, 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).

2. Article I (One person-One vote)

In Count I of their amended complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Act 1 violates Article I, § 2 of the United States Constitution¹¹ by diluting the vote of persons living in over-populated congressional districts. Defendants contend that this claim must be dismissed because Plaintiffs have failed to allege that: (1) a plan with smaller population deviations than Act 1 could have been enacted; or (2) that the deviations in Act 1 were unavoidable.

Article I, § 2, requires that members of Congress are chosen with equal representation for equal numbers of people. *Wesberry v. Sanders*, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1963). This Constitutional mandate, commonly referred to as the one person-one vote principle, requires "that as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's." *Id.* As the Supreme Court has explained:

[T]he "nearly as practicable" standard requires that the State make a good-faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality. . . . Unless population variances among congressional districts are shown to have resulted, despite such effort, the State must justify each variance, *no matter how small*. . . . [Article I, § 2, therefore] permits only the limited population variances which are unavoidable despite a good-faith effort to achieve absolute equality, or for which justification is shown."

Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530-31 (1969) (emphasis added).

Thus, in a challenge to a congressional redistricting plan, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving that the differences in district-to-district population could have been reduced or eliminated by "a good-faith effort to draw districts of equal population." *Karcher v. Daggett*, 462 U.S. 725, 730 (1983). If the

¹¹In relevant part, Article I, § 2 states: "[Congressional] Representatives . . . shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers. . . ."

plaintiffs can demonstrate that the differences in population were not the result of a good-faith effort to achieve equality in population between the various districts, then the State must prove that some legitimate reasons justifies the variances. *Id.* at 731.

Defendants argue that this claim should be dismissed because Plaintiffs have not offered a plan with smaller deviations, and Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the deviations in Act 1 were unavoidable. According to Defendants, although there are variations in Act 1, they equal 0.00%. Therefore, “[a]s a matter of law, the district populations are equal and there is no significant variance between districts to be explained.” (Def. Pres. Offs. Br. in Sup. Mot. to Dis. at 8.) However, the Supreme Court has squarely rejected any *de minimis* exception to the requirement of absolute equality in population between districts. *Karcher*, 462 U.S. at 734 (“[T]here are no *de minimis* variations, which could practically be avoided, but which nonetheless meet the standard of Art. I, § 2 without justification.”) “Article I, § 2, . . . permits only the limited population variations which are unavoidable despite a good faith effort to achieve absolute equality, or for which justification is shown.” *Id.* at 730. Contrary to Defendants’ contention, the only variations which are per se excusable are those which are unavoidable. For example, Pennsylvania’s population of 12,281,054 does not divide equally between its allotted nineteen districts. Therefore, if all of the districts under Act 1 had populations of 646,371 or 646,372, then the court could conclude that the differences in population were unavoidable and would not have to examine whether Act 1 was enacted in good faith.

However, according to Plaintiffs’ allegations, this is simply not the case. District 7, the most populated district, has a population of 646,380, and Districts 1, 2, and 17, the least populated districts, have populations of 646,361; a maximum

difference in population of nineteen. These variances, therefore, are not per se unavoidable. See e.g. *Anne Arundel County Republican Cent. Comm. v. State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws*, 781 F. Supp. 394, 395-96 (D. Md. 1991) (holding that a maximum deviation of ten between the most populated and the least populated districts does not satisfy *Karcher*'s requirement of absolute equality). Plaintiffs also allege that Act 1's variances are not the result of a good-faith effort to achieve population parity, but rather are part of a Republican plan to eliminate Democratic representatives from Congress. Additionally, Plaintiffs make several factual allegations that, if proven, would tend to undermine any justification Defendants might proffer in support of Act 1's population variances.

Defendants cite *Karcher* for the proposition that Plaintiffs must allege that a plan with smaller deviations was possible. The court finds that argument unpersuasive. In *Karcher*, the plaintiffs provided the court with an alternative plan as evidence that the challenged plan was not the result of a good-faith effort to achieve district population parity. 462 U.S. at 397. That case, however, had proceeded beyond the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. While Plaintiffs may have to provide such a plan in order to satisfy their ultimate burden of persuasion in this case, there is nothing in the *Karcher* decision indicating that such a plan must be alleged in the complaint. Plaintiffs, therefore, have pleaded a prima facie violation of the one person-one vote command of Article I, § 2. Accordingly, the court will deny Defendants' motion to dismiss Count I of Plaintiffs' amended complaint.

3. Equal Protection (Partisan Gerrymandering)

_____ In *Davis v. Bandemer*, the Supreme Court first recognized that claims for violation of equal protection based on partisan gerrymandering present justiciable issues. 478 U.S. at 123-26. Although that holding commanded a majority, only a plurality of the court endorsed the standards setting out what constitutes such a violation. Where a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale earns the endorsement of five Justices, “the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.” *Gregg v. Georgia*, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n. 15 (1976). Therefore, we may correctly view the plurality’s analysis in *Bandemer* as constituting the governing standards to be applied in this case. *Accord Pope v. Blue*, 809 F. Supp. 392, 395 (W.D.N.C. 1992); *Republican Party v. Wilder*, 774 F. Supp. 400, 403-04 (W.D. Va. 1991); *Badham v. Fong Eu*, 694 F. Supp. 664, 668 (N.D. Cal. 1988).

In *Bandemer*, a plurality of the Court held that a plaintiff, in order to succeed on an equal protection claim of partisan gerrymandering, must “prove both intentional discrimination against an identifiable political group and an actual discriminatory effect on that group.” 478 U.S. at 127. With this standard in mind, we now examine Plaintiffs’ amended complaint in order to determine whether they have alleged facts that, if proven, would constitute an equal protection violation.

a. Identifiable Political Group

Defendants initially argue that Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts that could establish that they are members of an identifiable political group. Specifically, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts demonstrating that Democrats in Pennsylvania vote as a block. However, Defendants do not point to any authority which would require such an allegation. The court has scoured the

Bandemer decision and has found no such requirement. Instead, the court finds that *Bandemer* indicates that Plaintiffs must allege only that they are members of an identifiable political group whose geographical distribution is sufficiently ascertainable that it could have been used in drawing electoral district lines. Clearly, by alleging that they are Pennsylvanian citizens who vote for Democrats, Plaintiffs have satisfied this requirement.

b. Discriminatory Intent

Both parties appear to recognize that the intent requirement in this case has been met. As the *Bandemer* plurality pointed out, “[a]s long as redistricting is done by a legislature, it should not be very difficult to prove that the likely political consequences of the reapportionment were intended.” *Id.* at 128. In this case, Plaintiffs allegations – that the Republican majority in the Pennsylvania General Assembly prevented all Democratic input on Act 1 in order to establish a Republican super-majority in Pennsylvania’s congressional caucus – are sufficient to satisfy their pleading requirement.

c. Actual Discriminatory Effects

The analysis as to the actual discriminatory effect is not nearly as simple. It appears that the effects analysis itself involves another two-pronged determination. First, Plaintiffs must prove an actual or projected history of disproportionate election results. Second, Plaintiffs must prove that “the electoral system is arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a voter’s, or group of voters’, influence on the political process as a whole.” *Id.* at 105. While Plaintiffs’ allegations may be sufficient to satisfy the first requirement as a projection of disproportionate election results, they do not indicate that Plaintiffs have been, or

will be, prevented from participating in the political process. Even assuming *arguendo* that Plaintiffs' allegations are true, the court will dismiss Plaintiffs' equal protection claim because Plaintiffs have not alleged facts indicating that as a result of Act 1 Plaintiffs will be completely shut out of the political process.

We begin our analysis by stating that the recondite standard enunciated in *Bandemer* offers little concrete guidance. However, the result may assist us. In that case, Republicans enjoyed majorities in both houses of the state legislature, and the Governor was a Republican. Exploiting these majorities, the Republicans adopted a state legislature redistricting plan that heavily favored Republicans. The plaintiffs in *Bandemer* filed suit challenging the plan as a violation of equal protection. At trial before a three-judge panel, the plaintiffs presented the following evidence: (1) of the statewide votes cast in the elections for the State House of Representatives, Democratic candidates received 51.9% of the vote, but won only forty-three of the 100 seats available; (2) of the statewide votes cast in the elections for the State Senate, Democratic candidates received 53.1% of the vote, but won only thirteen of the twenty-five seats available; (3) in two counties where 46.6% of the voting population tended to vote Democrat on a regular basis, Republicans won 85% of the seats available – eighteen out of twenty-one; (4) the plan disregarded political subdivision boundaries defining communities of interest; and (5) the plan disregarded the one person-one vote imperative and the Voting Rights Act's no retrogression requirement. 478 U.S. at 116, 134. On this evidence, the panel held that the plan violated equal protection as a partisan gerrymandering.

A plurality of the Supreme Court, however, overturned that result. In doing so, the Court held that the evidence failed to establish that the redistricting

plan had a sufficiently adverse impact on the Indiana Democrats to constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. *Id.* at 129. Specifically, the Court stated that "the mere lack of proportional representation will not be sufficient to prove unconstitutional discrimination. Again, without specific supporting evidence, a court cannot presume in such a case that those who are elected will disregard the disproportionately underrepresented group." *Id.* at 105. According to the Court, the plaintiffs failed to provide any such evidence and, therefore, failed to establish an equal protection violation.

The three-judge panel in *Badham v. Fong Eu*¹² applied the *Bandemer* standard and concluded that the plaintiffs there had not satisfied their burden of alleging that California's congressional redistricting plan resulted in Republicans being shut out of the political process as a whole. 694 F. Supp. at 670-71. In that case, an outgoing Democratic Governor colluded with the Democratic majority in the state legislature to pass a congressional redistricting plan that heavily favored Democratic candidates. In the first election held under that plan, Republicans received 50.1% of the vote statewide, but received only 40% of the congressional seats (eighteen of forty-five). The defendants filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The panel granted the motion holding that the plaintiffs had failed to allege facts that, if proven, would demonstrate an actual discriminatory effect on

¹² Although the Supreme Court did not grant *certiorari* to hear the *Badham* case, it did summarily affirm the three-judge panel's decision. See *Badham v. Eu*, 488 U.S. 1024 (1989). Unlike a denial of *certiorari*, a summary affirmation by the Supreme Court creates precedential authority binding on the lower courts. See 12 Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 400.05-1 (3d ed. 1999). This authority extends only to the judgment's result, and not the underlying reasoning. *Mandel v. Bradley*, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977). "Nevertheless, due in particular to the fact that the *Bandemer* Court was unable to agree on a majority opinion, we believe that the *Badham* court's interpretation of *Bandemer*, subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court, is entitled to substantial deference." *Pope v. Blue*, 809 F. Supp. at 395 n.2.

Californian Republicans. The *Badham* panel focused its analysis on the effects the plan would have on California's political landscape as a whole.

It is on this second prong of the "effects" threshold that plaintiffs' complaint falters. Specifically, there are no factual allegations regarding California Republicans' role in the political process as a whole. . . . There are no allegations that California Republicans have been "shut out" of the political process, nor are there allegations that anyone has ever interfered with Republican registration, organizing, voting, fund-raising, or campaigning. Republicans remain free to speak out on issues of public concern; plaintiffs do not allege that there are, or have been, any impediments to their full participation in the uninhibited, robust, and wide-open public debate on which our political system relies. . . .

Particularly conspicuous by its absence is any allegation that plaintiffs' interests are being entirely ignored by their congressional representatives. . . . Instead, plaintiffs claim that Democratic incumbents will be reelected without need to attend to the views of fragmented and submerged Republican minorities in their districts. . . . Nowhere do plaintiffs suggest that they can prove disregard by any means other than by inference from the election results, a method which *Bandemer* removes from our purview.

Badham, 694 F. Supp. at 670-71 (internal quotations omitted).

In this case, Plaintiffs' allegations amount to this; Act 1 is rigged to guarantee that thirteen of Pennsylvania's nineteen congressional representatives will be Republicans. As a result, Democrats will have a more difficult time electing their candidates. Due to this impediment, "the Democratic Party will have greater difficulty in fielding competitive candidates." (Amd. Compl. at ¶ 35.) Thus, Act 1 operates "to essentially shut Democrats and Democratic voters out of the political process." (*Id.* at ¶ 36.) Plaintiffs, in particular, "will suffer harm . . . [because they] will now be increasingly represented by members of Congress who do not represent their views." (*Id.* at 37.)

As *Bandemer* and *Badham* dictate, these allegations are insufficient to make out a cause of action for violation of equal protection. First, Plaintiffs'

allegation that Republicans will earn a super-majority of the congressional representatives despite their status as a minority party statewide is simply an argument for proportional representation. However, *Bandemer* soundly rejected such a basis for an equal protection violation. See 478 U.S. at 130 ("Our cases, however, clearly foreclose any claim that the Constitution requires proportional representation or that legislatures in reapportioning must draw district lines to come as near as possible to allocating seats to the contending parties in proportion to what their anticipated statewide vote will be.")

Second, *Bandemer* was equally forceful in rejecting the presumption that voters who vote for losing candidates will not be adequately represented. See *id.* at 132 ("An individual or a group of individuals who votes for a losing candidate is usually deemed to be adequately represented by the winning candidate and has as much opportunity to influence that candidate as other voters in the district."). Therefore, Plaintiffs' allegation that they will be represented in Congress by Republicans who do not share their views bears no weight in our analysis.

Third, Plaintiffs' allegations that, due to Act 1, the Democratic party will have a greater difficulty in fielding competitive candidates is irrelevant. The focus in our inquiry is on the effect that the redistricting plan will have on an identifiable political group. In this case, as previously stated, that group is Pennsylvania Democratic voters. Therefore, the focus is on the effect Act 1 will have on the voters' ability to participate in the political process, not the Democratic party's health in Pennsylvania. The Constitution protects against partisan gerrymandering only because of the effect that it has on the individual's ability to exercise the fundamental right to vote. It goes without saying that political parties,

although the principal players in the political process, do not have the right to vote. Therefore, their health is a non-issue in the constitutional analysis. Stripped to its bones, Plaintiffs' allegations, in this respect, amount to a claim that Act 1 will make it more difficult for them to elect Democratic candidates to Congress. However, this simply is not the end-all be-all constitutional analysis that Plaintiffs make it out to be.

[T]he mere fact that a particular apportionment scheme makes it more difficult for a particular group in a particular district to elect representatives of its choice does not render that scheme constitutionally infirm. This conviction, in turn, stems from a perception that the power to influence the political process is not limited to winning elections. . . . Thus, a group's electoral power is not unconstitutionally diminished by the simple fact of an apportionment scheme makes winning elections more difficult, and a failure of proportional representation alone does not constitute impermissible discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.

Id. at 131-32.

Finally, we find that Plaintiffs' allegations do not indicate that Act 1 "essentially shuts . . . Democratic voters out of the political process." (Amend. Compl. at ¶ 36.) While Plaintiffs employ this phrase in their complaint, these words do not have the talismanic effect of converting Act 1 into an actionable constitutional violation. *See Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist.*, 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must treat a plaintiff's allegations as true, but need not give such credence to legal conclusions). While Plaintiffs allege that Democratic members of the Pennsylvania General Assembly were shut out of the redistricting process, there are no allegations that anyone has ever prevented, or will ever prevent, Plaintiffs from: registering to vote; organizing with other like-minded voters; raising funds on behalf of candidates; voting; campaigning; or speaking out on matters of public concern. *See Badham*,

694 F. Supp. at 670. Act 1 simply does not address such issues. In short, “[P]laintiffs do not allege that there are, or ever have been, any impediments to their full participation in the ‘uninhibited, robust, wide-open’ public debate on which our political system relies.” *Id.* (quoting *New York Times v. Sullivan*, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).

In summation, Plaintiffs have not alleged facts indicating that they have been shut out of the political process and, therefore, they cannot establish an actual discriminatory effect on them. Because the court holds that Plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient to pass the threshold effects analysis, the court will dismiss that portion of the complaint alleging that Act 1 violates the Equal Protection Clause.

4. Privileges and Immunities

In Count III of the amended complaint, Plaintiffs assert that Act 1 violates their rights pursuant to the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.¹³ However, the Third Circuit has recognized that “the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has ‘remained essentially moribund’ since the Supreme Court’s decision in *The Slaughter House Cases*, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872), and the Supreme Court has subsequently relied almost exclusively on the Due Process Clause as the source of unenumerated rights.” *In re Sacred Heart Hosp.*, 133 F.3d 237, 244 (3d Cir. 1997).

Plaintiffs, though, argue that Act 1 “grants Republicans their right to be free of a district that does not impermissibly burden their rights to an undiluted vote, but it denies that right to Democrats.” (Pls. Br. in Opp. Mot. to Dis. at 20.)

¹³In relevant part, the Fourteenth Amendment reads: “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. . . .” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

Therefore, according to Plaintiffs, there must be some legitimate governmental purpose for Defendants' actions. In support for this contention, Plaintiffs rely entirely upon *Saenz v. Roe*, 526 U.S. 489 (1999). In *Saenz*, the Court held unconstitutional a California statute that limited the welfare benefits of new residents during their first year of residency in that state. The statute, the Court reasoned, violated the fundamental right of citizens to travel from state to state. In making this determination, the Court held that the statute violated the third element of the right to travel – the right of the newly-arrived citizen to enjoy the same privileges and immunities “enjoyed by other citizens of the same State.” *Id.* at 502.

Plaintiffs, however, do not explain how the right to travel, which apparently is protected in some part by the Privileges and Immunities Clause, translates into a right to have proportional representation with Republican voters. Simply put, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, which protects against discrimination on the basis of state citizenship, has nothing to do with this case. In this case, there are no allegations that Plaintiffs are newly-arrived citizens of Pennsylvania or that they are citizens of other states. In fact, the amended complaint clearly states that both Plaintiffs and Defendants are citizens of Pennsylvania. (*See* Amd. Compl. at ¶¶ 2-5.) Because Plaintiffs have failed to allege a cause of action for violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the court will dismiss Count III of the amended complaint.

5. First Amendment

In Count IV of the amended complaint, Plaintiffs assert that Act 1 violates their right to free association as guaranteed to them by the First Amendment.

The gravamen of Plaintiffs' claim is that Act 1 constitutes a governmental classification based on political affiliation and, thus, violates their right to free association.

It is well established that the "First Amendment protects political association as well as political expression." *Buckley v. Valeo*, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976). However, Plaintiffs fail to explain how Act 1 penalizes them for their exercise of First Amendment rights. Instead, Plaintiffs try to analogize their claim to a ballot access denial or a denial of the right to vote. However, nowhere in Plaintiffs' amended complaint do they allege that Act 1 prevents them from voting or having access to the ballot. Instead, Plaintiffs imply that Act 1 makes it more difficult for them to exercise these rights.

It is true that the First Amendment guarantees participation in the political process. However, as the legion of case law and common sense dictate, it does not guarantee that such participation will be successful. *Accord Republican Party v Martin*, 980 F.2d 943, 960 (4th Cir. 1992); *Pope v. Blue*, 809 F. Supp. at 398; *Badham*, 694 F. Supp. at 675. "Because there is 'no device that directly inhibits participation in the political process,' [Plaintiffs'] freedom of association claim boils down to the argument that they are entitled to political success." *Pope*, 809 at 398. This is a right which the Constitution does not guarantee. Therefore, we hold that the Plaintiffs' freedom of association claim is coextensive with their equal protection claim. *Accord Id.* As discussed above, *see supra*. Part II.B.3, Plaintiffs have not stated a claim for a recognized violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, the court will dismiss Plaintiffs' claim in Count IV for failure to state a claim for violation of their First Amendment right to free association.

6. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

_____ In Count V, Plaintiffs assert a claim based on violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, as previously stated, *see supra.* at 6, n.6, “§ 1983 does not create substantive rights but ‘merely redresses the deprivation of . . . rights. . . created by the Constitution or federal statute.’ ” *Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. for M.E.*, 178 F.3d 238, 251-52 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting *W.B. v. Matula*, 67 F.3d 484, 493 (3d Cir. 1995)). Accordingly, the court has construed Plaintiffs’ amended complaint as an action brought pursuant to § 1983 to vindicate their rights under the Constitution. Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiffs seek an independent basis for recovery, Count V will be dismissed.

7. Relief Sought

Finally, Defendants contend that the remainder of Plaintiffs’ complaint must be dismissed because the court cannot grant the type of relief which Plaintiffs request. Specifically, Defendants rely upon *Grove v. Emison*, 507 U.S. 25, 34 (1993), for the proposition that the court is without power to create a new redistricting plan. That is, even if the court determines that Act 1 is unconstitutional, we must defer to the State legislature or judicial system to create a new plan. However, the court need not address that issue at this time. Plaintiffs request that the court grant a declaratory judgment that Act 1 violates the one person-one vote requirement of Article I. Clearly, the court has the remedial power to issue such a declaratory judgment.

III. Conclusion

As to Defendant Executive Officers’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court will grant that motion in part and will deny it in

part. The court will grant the motion as to Defendant Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, which will be dismissed from the suit on the basis of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. The court, however, will deny the motion in all other respects. Because the court finds that Plaintiffs have standing to sue, the court will deny Defendant Presiding Officers' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Additionally, as to the motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court will grant both motions in part and deny both motions in part. The court holds that Plaintiffs have alleged a valid cause of action for violation of the one person-one vote requirement of Article I. Accordingly, the motions will be denied as to Count I of the amended complaint. However, the court will grant the motion as to Counts II, III, IV and V. An appropriate order will issue.

Dated: February 22, 2002.

ペンシルバニア州中部地区

米国連邦地方裁判所

リチャード・ヴィース (Richard Vieth) 外

民事 No.1 : CV-01-2439

原告

対

ペンシルベニア州

被告

法廷意見

(略)

2 頁の赤線部分の和文：

原告の請求は、2002 年 1 月 7 日付シュワイカー知事が署名した（ペンシルバニア州選挙区割りに関するペンシルバニア州上院 1200 (Act 1/ 法律 1 号) の立法に関するものである。

4 頁の赤線部分の和文：

2000 年国税調査の結果によれば、ペンシルバニア州の人口は 12,281,054 人であった。この人口を 19 の連邦下院議員選挙区で等分すると、選挙区当り 646,371 人又は 646,372 人となる。

しかしながら、Act 1 (法律 1 号) によれば、第 7 選挙区の人口は、646,380 人であり、第 1、第 2 又は第 7 選挙区の人口は、それぞれ 646,361 人である。

30 頁の赤線部分の和文：

本法廷は、原告の連邦憲法 1 条の「一人一票の要求」違反の請求を、正当なものとして、認める。

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

**RICHARD VIETH, NORMA JEAN
VIETH, and SUSAN FUREY,**

CIVIL NO. 1:CV-01-2439

Plaintiffs

v.

**COMMONWEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA, *et al.*,**

Defendants

OPINION AND ORDER OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM

Before the court are Plaintiffs' motion to impose remedial districts and Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The parties have briefed the issue, as has *amicus curiae*. Additionally, the parties have presented oral argument on the instant motion. Accordingly, the matter is ripe for disposition.

I. Background

_____ This case involves an ongoing challenge to Pennsylvania's congressional redistricting effort. The Commonwealth initiated the redistricting process in response to the year 2000 decennial census which indicated that Pennsylvania would lose two seats in Congress due to shifts in the national population. Accordingly, the Commonwealth enacted its initial redistricting plan. That plan has been referred to throughout this litigation as Act 1.

Shortly thereafter, Plaintiffs initiated the instant suit seeking to have Act 1 declared unconstitutional, based on the following constitutional doctrines: (1) as an unconstitutional gerrymander in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; (2) as a violation of the principal of the one person-one

vote doctrine as that doctrine is embodied in Article I and the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause; (3) as a violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (4) as a violation of Plaintiffs' right to political association pursuant to the First Amendment. In accordance with the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2284, Chief Judge Edward Becker of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit appointed the present three judge panel to hear the challenge.

By an order dated February 22, 2002, the court dismissed all of Plaintiffs' claims, save for the one person-one vote claim. *See Vieth v. Pennsylvania*, 188 F. Supp.2d 532 (M.D. Pa. 2002) [hereinafter "*Vieth I*"]. On March 11 and 12, 2002, the court held an evidentiary hearing on that claim. On April 8, 2002, the court issued an opinion and order in which a majority of the court held that Act 1 violated the dictates of one person-one vote and enjoined its implementation. *See Vieth v. Pennsylvania*, 195 F. Supp.2d 672, 679 (M.D. Pa. 2002) [hereinafter "*Vieth II*"]. Additionally, the court granted the Pennsylvania General Assembly three weeks to submit a plan that would remedy the constitutional deficiencies in Act 1. *Id.*

Accordingly, on April 17, 2002, the General Assembly enacted a revised congressional redistricting plan. The next day, Governor Schweiker signed into law the new plan, Act 34. That bill repealed Act 1 and replaced it with Act 34's boundaries. Defendants then petitioned the court to stay its decision regarding Act 1 and to allow the 2002 congressional elections to proceed under Act 1's boundaries. Because primary elections were set to be held on May 21, 2002, the court agreed to stay its decision regarding Act 1 in order to allow the primary election to take place

as scheduled. Therefore, Act 34 was not in operation for the congressional elections that took place in November of 2002. However, Act 34 is scheduled to govern the next round of congressional elections in November of 2004.

Ostensibly, Act 34 is a zero-deviation congressional redistricting plan. That is, the district-to-district populations vary by only one person, the minimum variation given that Pennsylvania's population does not divide into nineteen even districts. On April 22, 2002, Plaintiffs filed a motion for the court to impose remedial districts or, in the alternative, to begin remedial hearings. Through information presented in that motion, the court learned for the first time of a decision by the Court of Common Pleas for Armstrong County, Pennsylvania. That decision was issued on March 15, 2002 – after enactment of Act 1, but before Act 34's enactment. The decision effectively altered the boundary between two voter precincts in Armstrong County – South Buffalo District Western and South Buffalo District Eastern. Those two precincts also represented the line dividing the 3rd and 12th Congressional Districts under both Act 1 and Act 34. The alteration had the effect of moving forty-nine people from the 12th Congressional District to the 3rd Congressional District. Apparently, this would have resulted in Act 34 having a deviation of ninety-seven between its most and least populated districts. This number would have represented a deviation over five times greater than that in Act 1. On May 16, 2002, the Commonwealth enacted another statute, Act 44, seeking to retroactively rescind the Armstrong County Court's ability to alter voter precinct boundaries.

The Board of Elections for Armstrong County then petitioned the Armstrong County Court of Common Pleas to vacate its decision altering the voter

precinct boundary. By an order dated July 29, 2002, the Armstrong County Court of Common Pleas denied the motion to vacate its decision. Eventually, this court scheduled a hearing for January 9, 2003 for the parties to present oral argument regarding whether Act 34 remedied the constitutional defect that the court found rendered Act 1 infirm.

In the interim, Governor Schweiker signed Act 150 into law on December 9, 2002. That statute amended § 506 of the Pennsylvania Election Code to add the following statement:

In administering elections for the nomination and election of candidates for the United States House of Representatives and the General Assembly, county boards of election shall adhere to the following rule: Where an election district is used in or pursuant to a congressional redistricting statute or the final plan of the Legislative Reapportionment Commission to define the boundary of a congressional district or state legislative district, the boundary of such election shall be the boundary existing and recognized by the Legislative Reapportionment Commission for the adoption of its final plan. The boundaries of the Congressional districts, as established by statute, and state legislative districts as set forth in the final plan of the Legislative Reapportionment Commission shall remain in full force and effect for use thereafter until the next reapportionment or redistricting as required by law and shall not be deemed to be affected by any action taken pursuant to this title.

Therefore, Act 150 had the apparent effect of negating the alteration of the boundary dividing the 3rd and 12th Congressional Districts.¹ Defendants subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment on December 20, 2002. On December 30, 2002, the court issued an order indicating that the parties should be prepared to present oral argument on this motion at the January 9 hearing and that

¹Plaintiffs conceded at oral argument – and in their brief – that Act 150, if validly enacted, eliminated any one person-one vote issue with reference to Act 34. (See Pls. Br. in Opp. Defs. Mot. for Sum. J. at 9 (“Act 150, if it were validly enacted and interpreted as Defendants suggest, would eliminate any one-person, one-vote concerns raised by Act 34.”).)

Plaintiffs should file their brief in opposition to summary judgment before the date of the hearing. On January 7, 2002, Plaintiffs filed their response to Defendants' summary judgment motion. On January 9, 2002, the court held its hearing.

The court's order of April 8, 2002 gave Defendants a period of time to "enact and submit for review and final approval by this Court, a congressional redistricting plan in conformity with this opinion." *See Vieth II*, 195 F. Supp.2d at 679. In response, the Commonwealth enacted Act 34. In accordance with the matters discussed at the January 9 hearing, the court finds that Act 34 sufficiently remedies the constitutional deficiencies of Act 1. Our hearing, was basically a review of Act 34 and we are now giving final approval to it. For the reasons stated below, the court finds that Act 34 does not violate any constitutional doctrine. The court, therefore, will deny Plaintiffs' motion to impose remedial districts. This decision renders Defendants' motion for summary judgment moot. The court, therefore, will not address that motion.

II. Analysis

A. Population Deviation

Article I, § 2 of the United States Constitution requires that members of Congress be chosen with equal representation for equal number of people. *Wesberry v. Sanders*, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1963). This constitutional mandate, commonly referred to as the one person-one vote principle, requires "that as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's." *Id.* As the Supreme Court has explained:

[T]he "nearly as practicable" standard requires that the State make a good-faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality. . . . Unless

population variances among congressional districts are shown to have resulted, despite such effort, the State must justify each variance, no matter how small. . . . [Article I, § 2, therefore] permits only the limited population variances *which are unavoidable despite a good-faith effort to achieve absolute equality, or for which justification is shown.*"

Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530-31 (1969) (emphasis added).

Thus, in a challenge to a congressional redistricting plan, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving: (1) that a deviation exists in district-to-district population which could have been reduced; and (2) the deviation is not a result of a good faith effort to achieve exact equality in district-to-district population. *See Karcher v. Daggett*, 462 U.S. 725, 730 (1983) (holding that the plaintiff's initial burden is to prove that the differences in district-to-district population could have been reduced or eliminated by "a good-faith effort to draw districts of equal population"). If the plaintiffs can meet its burden, then the State must prove that some legitimate reason justifies the variances. *See id.* at 731.

As to Act 1, the court unanimously found that Plaintiffs satisfied their initial burden. *See Vieth II*, 195 F. Supp.2d at 676, 679. Crucial to this holding was the testimony of Dr. John Memmi, the Republican House Caucus's congressional redistricting map-maker. Dr. Memmi testified that the Republican House leaders instructed him to stop shifting populations between districts once the process yielded a map with a nineteen person deviation. Although the court noted that such a deviation is minuscule given that Pennsylvania's census population totaled 12,281,054, it also noted that "*Karcher* specifically holds that 'there are no *de minimis* variations which could practically be avoided, but nonetheless meet the standard of Art. I, § 2 without justification.' " *Id.* at 676 (quoting *Karcher*, 462 U.S. at 734). Because the population deviation in Act 1 was not the result of a good faith

effort to achieve precise mathematical equality in district-to-district populations, the court held that Plaintiffs satisfied their initial burden under the *Karcher/Kirkpatrick* framework. *Id.*

Therefore, the burden switched to Defendants to justify the minuscule deviation in Act 1. A majority of the court held that Defendants failed to proffer any legitimate justification for the deviation. *Id.* at 678. The dissenting member of the court, however, found that Defendants justified the deviation by demonstrating that making Act 1 a zero deviation map would entail splitting twenty additional voter precinct districts; thus resulting in additional administrative costs and voter confusion. *Id.* at 680 (Yohn, J. dissenting in part).²

As to Act 34, the court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy their burden. First, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the variations in district-to-district population could have been reduced. Act 34 is a zero-deviation plan. They also argue that the Armstrong County Court's decision results in Act 34 having a ninety-seven person deviation. In response, Defendants contend that Act 150 effectively nullifies that change, forcing county boards of elections to use the same boundaries that were established by the Legislative Reapportionment Commission prior to the enactment of both Act 1 and Act 34. We do not need to decide this issue because even if Act 150 could not undo the Armstrong County Court's alteration, the court finds that Act 34, Act 44, and Act 150 represent "a good faith effort to draw districts of equal population." *Karcher*, 462 U.S. at 730.

²The majority, in contrast, noted evidence indicating that it was possible to draw a zero deviation map that split no voter precincts. *See id.* at 677 (noting that "it is possible to draw a congressional district map with zero deviation and no precinct splits").

The court is convinced that the General Assembly passed Act 34 expecting that it would be a zero-deviation map. This is evidenced by the fact that since the Armstrong County Court's decision, the General Assembly has twice, through enactment of Acts 44 and 150, sought to undo the alteration brought about by that decision. These three statutes, when read together, evidence a good-faith effort to draw districts of equal population, even if Acts 44 and 150 are later declared invalid as violations of the Pennsylvania Constitution as Plaintiffs argue they should be.³ As to Act 34, unlike Act 1, there is no evidence indicating that the General Assembly intended that there be a deviation or that it considered the slight deviation a non-issue. *See Vieth II*, 195 F. Supp.2d at 676 (discussing Dr. Memmi's testimony and concluding that "Defendants did not put forth a good-faith effort to draw districts of equal population"). Likewise, there is no evidence in the record indicating that members of the General Assembly, when passing Act 34, relied on anything other than the population data prepared from the census tracts compiled by the bi-partisan Legislative Data Processing Center in considering the population of election precincts and congressional districts. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record which suggests that members of the legislature were even aware of the change in the election districts in South Buffalo Township when they voted to pass

³The court notes that Act 34 represents a good faith effort to achieve zero deviation, but like its predecessor, Act 1, jettisons every other neutral non-discriminatory redistricting criteria that the Supreme Court has endorsed in one person-one vote cases. *See Karcher*, 462 U.S. 753-59 (Stevens, J. concurring) (holding that compliance with neutral criteria demonstrates that the legislature's intention is designed to further non-discriminatory policies); *see also Vieth II*, 195 F. Supp.2d at 678 ("[I]t is clear that *Karcher*'s neutral criteria were not high on the priority list in enacting Act 1.") Despite an opportunity to improve upon the numerous deficiencies of Act 1, Defendants have returned to this court with essentially the same map. However, this map does not possess the same population deviations as Act 1. Therefore, Plaintiffs have failed to meet their initial burden under *Karcher*, and the court has no opportunity to address these criteria as they relate to Act 34.

Act 34 on April 17, 2002. There is simply no evidence in the record indicating that the General Assembly intended to enact anything other than a zero-deviation congressional redistricting plan. The court, therefore, finds that Act 34 represents a good faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality in congressional district-to-district population. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy their burden.

Because the court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy their initial burden under the *Karcher* test, no inquiry regarding justification is needed for there is nothing to justify. Act 34 complies with the dictates of the one person-one vote doctrine.

B. Plaintiffs' Challenge to Act 150 based on Pennsylvania Constitutional Law

Plaintiffs challenge the validity of Act 150 on the basis that it violates a litany of Pennsylvania Constitutional doctrines. However, because the court has already held that Acts 34, 44 and 150, when read in conjunction, evidence a good-faith effort to achieve population equality, the validity of these statutes is immaterial. *See Kirkpatrick*, 394 U.S. at 530-31 (“[T]he ‘nearly as practicable’ standard requires that the State make a good-faith effort to achieve mathematical equality. *Unless population variances among congressional districts are shown to have resulted despite such effort*, the State must justify each variance, no matter how small.” (emphasis added)).

The court, therefore, need not decide these issues of Pennsylvania law because even if they were resolved in Plaintiffs' favor, the court finds that the three statutes at issue – Acts 34, 44, and 150 – at the very least represent a good-faith effort to achieve equal district-to-district population. Even if Acts 44 and 150 were

to be declared invalid, this would have no effect on the claim that Act 34 violates the one person-one vote doctrine.

C. Partisan Gerrymandering

Plaintiffs also seek to preserve their argument that Act 34 is a partisan gerrymandering and, thus, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As discussed earlier, Plaintiffs presented the same argument with respect to Act 1. In *Vieth I*, the court dismissed this claim because "Plaintiffs [did not] allege facts indicating that they have been shut out of the political process and, therefore, they cannot establish an actual discriminatory effect on them," as required by *Davis v. Bandemer*, 478 U.S. 109 (1986). *Vieth I*, 188 F. Supp.2d 532, 547 (M.D. Pa. 2002). Act 34 is essentially the same redistricting plan as Act 1, except for the fact that Act 34 does not possess an avoidable population deviation. Accordingly, whatever partisan effect Act 1 had, Act 34 will have as well. The court, therefore, incorporates by reference its discussion in *Vieth I* regarding partisan gerrymandering and holds that the undisputed facts in this case are insufficient to establish such a claim. *See id.* at 543-47.

IV. Conclusion

Act 34 does not violate the principal of one person-one vote. Therefore, Act 34 remedies Act 1's constitutional defect. Additionally, Act 34 is not a partisan gerrymandering, at least as far as that term is defined by the Supreme Court in *Davis v. Bandemer*, 478 U.S. 109 (1986). Therefore, the court will deny Plaintiff's motion to impose remedial districts. Because the court has decided that Act 34 cures the constitutional defect found by the court in its memorandum and

order of April 8, 2002, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is moot. An appropriate order will issue.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RICHARD VIETH, NORMA JEAN	:	CIVIL NO.1:CV-01-2439
VIETH, and SUSAN FUREY,	:	
	:	
Plaintiffs	:	
	:	
v.	:	
	:	
COMMONWEALTH OF	:	
PENNSYLVANIA, <i>et al.</i>	:	
	:	
Defendants	:	

ORDER

In accordance with the accompanying memorandum of law, **IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED THAT:**

(1) Defendant Executive Officers' motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is **GRANTED IN PART** and **DENIED IN PART**, as follows:

(A) As to Defendant Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the motion is **GRANTED**, all claims against the Commonwealth are dismissed;

(B) In all other respects, the motion is **DENIED**;

(2) Defendant Presiding Officers' motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is **DENIED**;

(3) Defendant Executive Officers' motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is **GRANTED IN PART** and **DENIED IN PART**, as follows:

(A) The motion is **GRANTED** as to Counts II, III, IV and V of the amended complaint;

(B) The motion is **DENIED** as to Count I of the amended complaint;

(4) Defendant Presiding Officers' motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is **GRANTED IN PART** and **DENIED IN PART**, as follows:

(A) The motion is **GRANTED** as to Counts II, III, IV and V of the amended complaint;

(B) The motion is **DENIED** as to Count I of the amended complaint.


/s/ Richard L. Nygaard
RICHARD L. NYGAARD
United States Circuit Judge

/s/ William H. Yohn, Jr.
WILLIAM H. YOHN, Jr.
United States District Judge

/s/ Sylvia H. Rambo
SYLVIA H. RAMBO
United States District Judge

Dated: February 22, 2002.

FILED 02/22/2002



ペンシルバニア州中部地区

米国連邦地方裁判所

RICHARD VIETH、NORMA JEAN VIETH
及び SUSANFUREY

原告

対

ペンシルベニア州 外

被告

民事 No.1 : CV-01-2439

法廷意見

PER CURIAM

裁判の対象は、救済のための選挙区を設定することを求める原告らの申立及びサマリージャッジメントを求める被告らの申立である。当事者は、法廷助言者として、争点について意見を述べた。加えて、当事者は、即時申立について口頭弁論を行った。従って、本件は、処分を下すための機が熟している。

I 背景

_____本件は、ペンシルバニア州の連邦下院選挙区再編（congressional redistricting）の努力に対する進行中の異議に関わる。州は、人口の移動のためにペンシルバニア州が連邦議会での 2 議席を失うことを示す、2000 年の 10 年ごとの国勢調査に対応して、再編のプロセスを開始した。その後、州は、最初の再編案を制定した。その案は本訴訟を通じて法律第 1 号（= Act 1）として言及されている。

その後直ぐに、原告らは、以下の憲法上の法理に基づき、法律第 1 号を違憲であると宣言することを求める本訴訟を提起した：(1)米国憲法修正第

14 条に違反する違憲なゲリマンダー；(2)第 1 条及び修正第 14 条平等権条項に含まれる法理である、一人一票法理の原則違反；(3)修正第 4 条の特権及び免除条項違反；及び(4)修正第 1 条に従った原告らの政治的結社の権利の侵害。米国法律集 28 編 2284 条の要件に従い、第 3 巡回区連邦控訴裁判所の Edward Becker 首席裁判官は、本異議を審理するため、現在の 3 人の合議体を指名した。

2002 年 2 月 22 日付け命令によって、裁判所は、一人一票の請求を除き、原告らの請求の全てを棄却した。*Vieth v. Pennsylvania*, 188 F. Supp.2d 532 (M.D. Pa. 2002) [以下 “*Vieth I*”] 参照。2002 年 3 月 11 日及び 12 日、裁判所は、同請求について証拠提示のための審理を開いた。2002 年 4 月 8 日、裁判所は、意見及び命令を発し、その中で、法廷多数意見は、法律第 1 号は一人一票の要求に違反し、その実行を差し止める、と判示した。*Vieth v. Pennsylvania*, 195 F. Supp.2d 672 (M.D. Pa. 2002) [以下 “*Vieth II*”] 参照。加えて、裁判所は、ペンシルバニア州議会に対し、法律第 1 号における憲法上の問題を治癒する案を提出するために 3 週間を与えた。前掲。

その後、2002 年 4 月 17 日、州議会は、改訂した連邦下院選挙区再編の案 (a revised congressional redistricting plan) を制定した。翌日、Schweiker 知事が署名し当該新案が法律第 34 号 (= Act 34) として成立した。当該法案は、法律第 1 号 (= Act 1) を廃止し、それを法律第 34 号の境界線に置き換えた。被告らは、その後、裁判所に対し、法律第 1 号に関する決定を停止し、2002 年の連邦議会選挙を法律第 1 号の境界線のもとで行うことを許可するよう申し立てた。予備選挙が 2002 年 5 月 21 日に行われることに決まっていたため、裁判所は、当該予備選挙を予定通り行うことを許可するため、法律第 1 号に関する決定を停止することに同意した。従って、法律第 34 号は、2002 年 11 月に行われた連邦議会選挙には適用されなかった。しかしながら、法律

第 34 号は、2004 年 11 月の次回の連邦議会選挙に適用されることが予定されている。

みたところ、法律第 34 号は、人口差異ゼロ（a zero-deviation）の連邦下院選挙区再編の案である。すなわち、選挙区ごとの人口は、ペンシルバニア州の人口が 19 の等しい地区に分割されないことを考えれば最小の人口差異である、1 人しか異ならない。2002 年 4 月 22 日、原告らは、裁判所に対し、救済のための選挙区を設定すること、又は、選択的に、救済のための審理を開始することの申立を行った。当該申立で提示された情報を通じ、裁判所は、ペンシルバニア州アームストロング・カウンティ（訳者注：州の中の一
番大きな行政区画であって、その中に市町村を含む）の一般訴訟裁判所による決定について、初めて知った。同決定は、2002 年 3 月 15 日—法律第 1 号の制定後だが、法律第 34 号の制定前—に下された。同決定は、アームストロング・カ
ウンティの二つの投票区—サウスバッファロー地区西部とサウスバッファロー地区東部との間の境界線を事実上変更した。これらの二つの投票区は、法律第 1 号及び法律第 34 号のいずれのもとでも、第 3 及び第 12 連邦議会選挙
区を分けるラインをも表していた。同変更は、49 人を第 12 連邦選挙区から第 3 連邦議会選挙区に移す効果があった。どうやら、これにより、法律第 34
号はその最大と最小の人口の選挙区間で 97 人の差を有する結果となった。この数は、法律第 1 号における数の 5 倍以上の差を意味した。2002 年 5 月 16
日、州は別の法律である法律第 44 号を制定し、アームストロング・カウンティ裁判所が投票区の境界を変更する能力について、遡及的に取り消そうとした。

アームストロング・カウンティの選挙委員会は、その後、アームストロング・カウンティ一般訴訟裁判所（Court of Common Pleas）に対し、投票区の境界を変更した決定を無効にするよう申し立てた。2002 年 7 月 29 日付

け命令で、アームストロング・カウンティ一般訴訟裁判所は、決定を無効にするよう求める申立を棄却した。最終的に、本裁判所は、法律 34 号が、法律 1 号に瑕疵を生じさせたと裁判所が判断した憲法上の問題を治癒したかに関し、当事者が口頭弁論を行うため、2003 年 1 月 9 日の審理を予定した。

その間、Schweiker 知事は 2002 年 12 月 9 日に法律第 150 号 (Act 150) に署名し成立させた。同法は、ペンシルベニア選挙法第 506 条を修正し、次の文言を追加した。

米国下院及び州議会のための指名選挙及び候補者選挙の管理にあたり、カウンティ選挙委員会は、次のルールに従う：ある選挙における選挙区が、連邦下院選挙区又は州議会選挙区の境界確定のために、連邦下院の再区割の制定法又は議席再割当委員会の最終案で使用されているか又はそれらに従っている場合、当該選挙の境界は、既存であって、議席再割当委員会がその最終案の採択において認識していた境界であるものとする。制定法で定められる連邦下院選挙区及び議席再割当委員会の最終案に定められる州議会選挙区の境界は、以降、法による次の再割当又は再区割まで、完全に有効であるものとし、本章に従ったいかなる行為にも影響されないものとする。

従って、法律第 150 号は、第 3 及び第 12 連邦議会選挙区を分ける境界の変更を無効にする見かけ上の効果があった¹。被告らは、その後、2002 年 12 月 20 日、サマリージャッジメントの申立を行った。2002 年 12 月 30 日、裁判所は、当事者はこの申立について 1 月 9 日の審理で口頭弁論を行う準備を行い、原告らは当該審理日より前にサマリージャッジメントに反対す

¹ 原告らは、口頭弁論一及び準備書面一において、法律 150 号は、有効に制定されていた場合は、法律第 34 号に関するあらゆる一人一票の争点を取り除く、と認めた。(Pls. Br. In Opp. Defs. Mot. For Sum. J. at 9 (“法律第 150 号は、仮に被告らが主張するように、それが有効に制定され、解釈されるのであれば、法律第 34 号により提示されるいかなる一人一票に関する懸念も取り除かれるであろう。”) 参照。)

る準備書面を提出するよう指示する命令を発した。2002 年（ママ）1 月 7 日、原告らは、被告らのサマリージャッジメントの申立に対する回答を提出した。2002 年（ママ）1 月 9 日、裁判所は、審理を行った。

2002 年 4 月 8 日の裁判所の命令は、被告らに対し、“本意見に合致した連邦下院選挙区再編の法律案を、本裁判所による審査と最終の承認のために、制定し、提出する”ための期間を与えた。*Vieth II*, 195 F. Supp.2d at 679 参照。それに応じて、州は、法律第 34 号を制定した。1 月 9 日の審理で議論した事項に従って、裁判所は、法律第 34 号は、法律第 1 号の憲法上の問題を十分に治癒していると判断する。我々の審理は、基本的に法律第 34 号の審査であったが、我々はそれに対する最終の承認を現在与えている。下記の理由から、裁判所は、法律第 34 号は、いかなる憲法上の法理にも違反しないと判断する。従って、裁判所は、救済のための選挙区を設定することを求める原告らの申立を棄却することになる。本決定は、被告らのサマリージャッジメントの申立の実益を喪失させる。従って、裁判所は、この申立について判断しないことになる。

II 分析

A. 人口の差異（Population Deviation）

米国憲法第 I 章第 2 条は、連邦議会のメンバーが、同数の人々を等しく代表して選ばれること、を要求している。Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1963)。一般に一人一票原則と言及されるこの憲法上の要求は、“実行可能な限り近く、連邦議会選挙における 1 人の投票は、他者のものと同じ価値となること”を求めている。前掲。最高裁判所が説明しているように：

“実行可能な限り近く”との基準は、州が正確な数学的等しさを達成するために誠実に努力することを要求している。・・・議会の選挙区

間の人口の差異が、当該努力にかかわらず生じたと証明された場合を除き、州は、いかに小さくとも各人口差異を正当化しなければならない。・・・[第1章第2条、従って]絶対的な平等を達成するための誠実な努力にかかわらず避けられない、又はその正当性が証明された、限られた人口の差異のみが許される。”

Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530-31 81969) (強調追加)。

従って、連邦下院選挙区再編の案に対する異議では、原告らは、(1)選挙区ごとの人口に、減らすことができた人口差異 (deviation) が存在すること；及び(2)その人口差異が、選挙区ごとの人口における正確な等しさを達成する誠実な努力の結果ではないこと、の最初の立証責任を負担する。Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 730 (1983) (原告の最初の責任は、選挙区ごとの人口の相違が、“同数の人口による選挙区を作成する誠実な努力”によって、減らせた又は取り除けたことを立証することであると述べている) 参照。仮に原告らがこの責任を果たした場合、次に州が何らかの合理的な理由によって当該人口差異が正当化されることを立証しなければならない。前掲 at 731 参照。

法律第1号について、裁判所は、原告らは最初の責任を果たしたと全員一致で判示した。Vieth II, 195 F. Supp.2d at 676, 679 参照。この判決によって重要であったことは、共和党下院執行部の議会における再編の区割地図 (map) 作成者である Dr. John Memmi の証言であった。Dr. Memmi は、共和党下院リーダーらが、プロセスが 19 人の人口差異のある区割地図ができた時点で、選挙区間で人口を移すことをやめるよう彼に指示した、と証言した。裁判所は、ペンシルバニア州の国勢調査での人口が合計 12,281,054 人であることからすると、当該差異は極めて小さいと言及したが、同様に “Karcher は ‘実務上避けうるにもかかわらず、正当理由なくして、米国連邦憲法第1章第2条の基準を満たすような極小の人口差異はない’ と明確に判示してい

る”ことに言及した。前掲 at 676 (Karcher, 462 U.S. at 734 を引用)。法律第 1 号における人口の差異は、選挙区ごとの人口の正確な数学的等しさを達成するための誠実な努力の結果ではなかったもので、裁判所は、原告らは、Karher/Kirkpatrick の枠組みのもとで最初の責任を果たしたと判示した。

従って、法律第 1 号における極小の人口差異を正当化するための立証責任は、被告らに課せられた。法廷多数意見は、被告らは、当該人口差異についての合理的な正当性を立証することに失敗したと判示した。前掲 at 678。しかしながら、法廷の反対意見は、被告らは、法律第 1 号を人口差異ゼロの区割地図にすることが、20 の追加の投票区の分割、その結果として追加の行政費用及び投票者の混乱を伴うこと、を証明することによって、当該人口差異を正当化した、と認定した。前掲 at 680 (Yohn, J. dissenting in part) ²。

法律第 34 号について、裁判所は、原告らは責任を果たすことに失敗したと認定している。最初に、原告らは、選挙区ごとの人口の差異が減らせたことの証明に失敗している。法律第 34 号は、人口差異ゼロの案である。彼らは同様に、アームストロング・カウンティ裁判所の決定によって、法律第 34 号は 97 人の人口差異があると主張する。これに対し、被告らは、法律第 150 号は、当該変更を効果的に無効にし、カウンティ選挙委員会に対し、法律第 1 号及び法律第 34 号の両方の制定前に議席再配分委員会により定められたものと同じ境界を使用させている、と争った。我々は、法律第 150 号がアームストロング・カウンティ裁判所の変更を取り消せなかった場合でも、裁判所は、法律第 34 号、法律第 44 号及び法律第 150 号は“同数の人口の選挙区を作成する誠実な努力”を示していると認定するため、この争点について

² 多数意見は、対照的に、人口差異ゼロの区割地図で投票区を分割しないものを作成可能であったことを示す証拠に言及した。前掲 at 677 (“人口差異ゼロで、投票区の分割なしの連邦下院選挙区の区割地図を作成することは可能である” との言及) 参照。

判決する必要はない。Krcher, 462 U.S. at 730.

裁判所は、州議会は、人口差異ゼロの区割地図であると考えて法律第 34 号を可決したと確信している。これは、アームストロング・カウンティ裁判所の決定以降、州議会が二度、法律第 44 号及び第 15 号の制定を通じて、当該決定によって起きた変更を取り消そうとした事実によって、証明されている。これらの 3 つの法は、仮に法律第 44 号及び第 150 号が、原告らがそうあるべきと主張するように³、ペンシルバニア州憲法違反により、後に無効であると宣言されるとしても、あわせて読めば、同数の人口の選挙区を作成する誠実な努力を証明している。法律第 1 号とは異なり、法律第 34 号については、州議会が人口差異があると意図していたこと又は僅かな人口差異は問題でないと考えていたこと、を示す証拠はない。Vieth II, 195 F. Supp.2d at 676 (Dr. Memmi の証言を議論し、“被告らは同数の人口の選挙区を作成するための誠実な努力をしていなかった”と結論付けている) 参照。同様に、記録上、州議会のメンバーが、法律第 34 号を可決するにあたり、選挙投票区及び連邦下院選挙区の人口を検討するとき、超党派の議会データ処理センターが蓄積した人口調査標準地域から作成された人口データ以外の何かに依拠していたことを示す証拠はない。更に、記録上、議会のメンバーが、彼らが

³ 裁判所は、法律第 34 号は、人口差異ゼロを達成するための誠実な努力を表しているが、その前任である法律第 1 号と同様、全ての他の中立な非差別的な再区割基準、これは最高裁判所が一人一票事件で是認してきた、を採っていないこと、に言及している。Karcher, 462 U.S. 753-59 (Stevens, J. が同意している) (中立基準の遵守は、議会の意図が更に非差別的な方針であることを示すと判示している) 参照；同様に Vieth II, 195 F. Supp.2d at 678 (“Karcher の中立基準は、法律第 1 号の制定において優先リストの上位になかったことは明らかである”) 参照。法律第 1 号の多数の問題を改善する機会にかかわらず、被告らは、本質的に同じ区割地図を本裁判所に戻してきた。しかしながら、この区割地図は、法律第 1 号と同じ人口差異を有してはいない。従って、原告らは、Karcher のもとでの最初の責任を果たすことに失敗しており、裁判所は、これらの基準が法律第 34 号に関連するため、これらに言及する機会がない。

2002 年 4 月 17 日に法律第 34 号を可決する投票をした際、サウス・バップ
アロー・タウンシップにおける選挙区の変化に気づいていたことを示唆する
証拠はない。単純に、記録上、州議会が、差異ゼロの連邦下院選挙区再編の
案以外の何かを制定する意図であったことを示す証拠がない。従って、裁判
所は、法律第 34 号は、議会の選挙区ごとの人口について、正確な数学的等し
さを達成するための誠実な努力を示していると認定する。その結果、原告ら
はその責任を果たすことに失敗している。

裁判所は、原告らは *Karcher* テストに基づく最初の責任を果たすこと
に失敗したと認定するので、正当化理由に関する審理は、正当化するものが
ないため、必要ない。法律第 34 号は、一人一票原則の命令に従っている。

B. ペンシルベニア州憲法に基づく法律第 150 号に対する原告ら
の異議

(略)

C. 党派的なゲリマンダリング

(略)

IV 結論

法律第 34 号は、一人一票原則に違反しない。従って、法律第 34 号は、法律第 1 号の憲法上の問題を治癒している。加えて、法律第 34 号は、党派的なゲルマンダリングではなく、少なくとも *Davis v. Bandemer*, 478 U.S. 109 (1986) で最高裁判所が定義した用語から外れている。従って、裁判所は、救済のための選挙区を設定することを求める原告らの申立を棄却する。裁判所は、法律第 34 号は、裁判所が 2002 年 4 月 8 日の覚書及び命令において認定した憲法上の問題は治癒していると判断しているので、サマリージャッジメ

ントを求める被告らの申立は、実益を欠く。適切な命令が発令されることになる。

